

the Cuban situation. 11 January 1961

I agree w/ deletions.

Pages 281-308 - 11 April 1961

11 April 1961

	Text line	CRD recommendation	Comment
release 283-	2, 3, 4	release	No. This is State deletion.
X 284	40, 41, 42	"	Deny Only 1/2 of 41 + 42
286	48, 49	"	No. State deletion
290	30 thru 35	Continued denial	State deletion but I agree
291	30 " 42	Release	w/ denial. No. This is State deletion.
return X 292	31, 32	Release	Deny. No. Deny.
302	26, 27, 28	Delete	make new deletion How can we, when already changed?

Briefing on Cuban Situation. 1 May 1961

Vol. 13 Part I

359	18 thru 31	Release	No. State deletion.
OK 378	46 thru 49	Delete	I agree.

Briefing on Cuban Situation. 2 May 61

391	43, 47, 48	Delete WRUL, release rest	I agree.
401	9	release	" "
402	16, 17	Delete	" "
405		"	" "
406			
407			
410		Release	" "
411			" "
416		"	" "
421			" "
424			" "
426			" "
430			

I would prefer to delete
this entire section including end of it?
and fatal on Cuba.

431 d agree
432 " "
433 " "
438 " "
443 I would have deleted entire sub section. agree
444 d agree
445 I would ~~delete~~ delete more. (no more). agree
446 agree
447 "
448 "
449 "

CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE CUBAN SITUATION"

Partical Transcript, Pages 43-46, 11 January 1961

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TEXT LINE</u>	<u>CIA REVIEW DECISION</u>
45	6, 7, 8	Delete: "We now ... took place" Reason: E.O. 12356, Section 1.3a(4)
	26, 27	Delete: "and we ... this conference," Reason: E.O. 12356, Section 1.3a(4)

CIA has completed the initial review of pages 43-46 and has marked in brackets the passages indicated above that are classified. The remainder of the transcript is unclassified.

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REVIEW WORKSHEET

EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)

VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961

"THE CUBAN SITUATION"

Partical Transcript, Pages 43-46, 11 January 1961

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TEXT LINE</u>	<u>CRD RECOMMENDATIONS</u>
45	6, 7, 8 (Soviet)	Delete: "We now ... took place" 1.3a(4)
	26, 27 (Soviet)	Delete: "and we ... this conference," 1.3a(4)

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R
FORTMAN, U

45

Mr. DULLES. Three, I think, three. So that it is in this kind of a world that one approaches the Cuban situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever tried to make an estimate of the volume, the size of their programs of this kind? I would just like to compare it with what we do in this field.

SECRET

1/2 GAL. - PART A

CIA REVIEW WORKSHEET
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)
VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961
"THE SITUATION IN LAOS"

Partial transcript, pages 281-308, 11 April 1961

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TEXT LINE</u>	<u>CIA REVIEW DECISION</u>
284	40, 41, 42	Release
292	31, 32	Release

CIA has reviewed again pages 281-308 and has found no passages that are classifiable from the CIA point of view. The Department of State should be consulted on passages previously deleted from declassification at their request.

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REVIEW WORKSHEET

EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE SENATE

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE (Historical Series)

VOLUME XIII, PART I, 1961

"THE SITUATION IN LAOS"

Partial transcript, pages 281-308, 11 April 1961

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TEXT LINE</u>	<u>CRD RECOMMENDATIONS</u>
284	40, 41, 42	Release (note 1)
292	31, 32	Release (note 1)

Note 1: This information revealed in Honorable Men, William Colby, pages 199, 200.

DDO/EA Memo, 22 June 1982 authorizes release of Laos information contained in Honorable Men (see attachments).

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To: DDO only

To accomplish even this much was not without its difficulties; of course. Flying hop, skip and jump through the karst mountains during tropical rainstorms, skittering along the Mekong at a ten-foot altitude under a twenty-foot ceiling, searching for an airfield on a flat stretch of the river's bank, and carrier-type landings in a swirl of dust on mountaintop airstrips called for a certain equanimity of spirit from the CIA officers who did them every day rather than on the semiannual visits I made. Flying in such conditions required care as well as daring from the magnificent Air America pilots and the installation of a complex of navigational and meteorological aids to supplement its swashbuckling image. Also, CIA's doctrines of clandestinity had to be stretched a good way to cover the "secret city" of 20,000 that grew up of the families of the tribal forces grouped around its headquarters. Moreover, appropriate uniforms had to be devised for the Thai officers and men who arrived to help with communications and training, since they could not officially be Thai and they certainly were not Lao. And a fine line had to be drawn between helping the tribal groups in their struggle and avoiding participation in some of the more primitive practices of those mountain peoples so far from civilization, including politely tasting but not ingesting the locally fermented rice "wine," keeping clear of the ritual bull-baiting that preceded feasts and tactfully turning down the maiden offered by the local chief to ease the strain of a mountain village visit.

One problem was fundamental to guerrilla war, only partly brought about by the actions of the other side. Some immutable principle provides that a barefoot guerrilla force must inevitably grow to become a conventional army. Tito's struggle against the Germans, Mao's against Chiang, and our Minutemen's against the British, all exemplify this. And it occurred in Laos as well. The successful teams in North Laos against the North Vietnamese requested heavier weapons first to improve their effectiveness and then to defend against North Vietnamese attacks on their villages instead of fleeing before them and harassing them from the rear. A few

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200 / HONORABLE MEN

captured artillery pieces turned against the enemy from the magnificent mountain ring around the Plain of Jars generated the demand for more, and successful forays by squads grew to battalion assaults to clear the enemy from the traditional tribal homelands.

But such escalation begat a reciprocal one from the other side; the enemy increased its forces and armaments to preserve its position and continue to assert its power in Laos.

There was one dramatic exception to the rule. Shortly after the first North Vietnamese aircraft was sighted in Laos—an ancient biplane dropping small bombs—an Air America helicopter happened nearby, whereupon the plane turned to attack the helicopter. The latter was unarmed, but it twisted around so that the crewman in the rear could empty a clip of his carbine at his assailant, and shot it down. The North Vietnamese air force did not return, and Air America remained a transport fleet with no combat aircraft or armaments. But nevertheless air support did become a greater element in the Lao war, first by the Royal Lao Air Force and later by the American, and not merely in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area.

166 A guerrilla force, successful as it may be in making it too costly for a conventional enemy army to control a country, cannot expel that enemy army from its territory. That can be done only by comparable conventional forces. Thus a successful guerrilla force almost inevitably will grow into a conventional army to free the national territory. [To help this development in Laos, CIA's Thai friends quietly dispatched "volunteers" to serve in Laos to improve the tribal forces' conventional capabilities against the increased presence of North Vietnamese divisions.]

Thus, contradicting the conclusion of Maxwell Taylor after the Bay of Pigs, CIA proved in the Lao war fully capable of the logistics and staff requirements to conduct a major paramilitary operation. But once the scale of the war went beyond the level of clandestine help to tribal patrols behind the North Vietnamese lines, it became virtually impossible to keep the effort secret as Agency doctrine required. Steady

S E C R E T

22 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: DO/Information Review Officer

INFO : Chief, Information Management Staff

FROM :
Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT : Review Coordination on U.S. Air Force
Manuscript "Interdiction in Southern Laos,
1960-68"

REFERENCE : A. DO/IRO Memorandum, same subject, dated
27 May 1982

B. DDA/CRD Memorandum, same subject, dated
21 May 1982

C. CEA Memorandum to DO/IRO, "Acknowledgement of CIA Presence in Vietnam," dated
2 June 1982

1. We would like first to address the general question of CIA presence in Laos. Similar to the proposed handling of CIA presence in Vietnam for military histories (reference C), we believe it is in the Agency's best interests to acknowledge CIA presence in Laos for the period 1962-73 (up to the period of the 2nd agreement to recognize a neutral and independent Laos) when addressing requests by U.S. military historians for inclusion of material referring to the Agency. Basically, and as noted in reference C for Vietnam, [we should not proceed beyond the confines of the text of former Director William Colby's (CIA-cleared) book "Honorable Men - My Life in the CIA" in revealing or acknowledging CIA activities/presence in Laos (most of the book's material on Laos is contained between pages 191-202).] As with reference C, we would again request U.S. military history units to be as discreet as possible in referring to information about CIA's activities with foreign liaison or other government organizations in recognition of the fact that the CIA must continue to deal with foreign governments and security services organizations around the world in a clandestine manner; we do not wish to jeopardize such relationships by surfacing publicly the details of past relationships and connections.

EXAMINED
CONTAINS NO POLITICAL OPINIONS
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP85B00236R000400090019-2

S E C R E T

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S E C R E T

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2. We are frankly dismayed at the way in which the Air Force historians have handled this particular historical compilation. Only after beginning our review of the manuscript did we discover that many, if not most, of the footnotes refer to classified material, yet no classification markings are included for any of these. This includes the Agency document "CIA History, Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-1977." (There are also at least two other Agency documents listed as sources - see Attachment B.) In regard to the latter document which we understand is controlled in this Agency by the Historical Staff, EA Division will not, as a matter of principle, agree to the U.S.A.F. use of this material since we would, in effect, be asserting classification/declassification actions over a CIA document which is not officially within our particular purview or possession. We do not agree with the manner in which the Air Force seeks to obtain declassification of portions of this document. In our view, they should approach the Historical Staff and request declassification of those parts on Laos they wish to have declassified, treating the document as a whole and not seeking to subject it to piecemeal declassification based on classified notes they have taken which may or may not prove to be accurate renditions of the text. We would entertain a request from Historical Staff (assuming that office is the official controlling unit of the CIA history) to EA Division to declassify portions of the document in question which would form the basis for later release to the Air Force. We have, therefore, listed in an attachment (Attachment A) all those textual parts of the U.S.A.F. manuscript which we refuse to address since they are either partly or wholly based on the CIA history, according to the source footnotes beginning on page 517. Thus, the Division does not agree to the release of these items. It should also be noted that it is virtually impossible to distinguish which parts of the text of the Air Force history relate to the CIA history, because (1) In some cases, the CIA history is only one of several source attributions contained in the same footnote, (2) There is no way of telling where the textual part attributed to the CIA History begins or ends.

3. We leave to DDA discretion how to treat the present U.S.A.F. practice of listing "CIA History, Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967" without classification; while we realize that ordinarily the mere general description of a document, plus its dates, is not in itself classified (if it does not reveal the subject of the textual data sufficient to be

S E C R E T

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revealing of the contents or thrust of the document), we believe in this case that the title is sufficiently revealing and may well stimulate voluminous requests for the document from CIA by readers who will be prone to consider it unclassified.

4. This Division objects to the citation of CIA facilities in Laos other than Vientiane. There are several places in the manuscript (other than those attributed to the CIA history) where mention is made of Agency facilities [redacted] and we ask that these be removed. [redacted] (examples of such entries.)

5. On a separate list (Attachment B), we have noted several items which should be reviewed with DDS&T for a decision on whether they can be released.

6. Aside from the exceptions listed in Attachments A and B and the required deletion of upcountry Laos CIA locations, we find no remaining classification problems. However, as in the treatment of the CIA history, we are disturbed at the manner in which the U.S.A.F. has extracted from other classified documents (State Department and military cables, memorandums) information which pertains to the Agency. The point is that we are not permitted full access to the documents and while the portion(s) excerpted do not pose classification difficulties, we have no way of telling what other CIA-related information might be in that document. Given this fact, how will the U.S.A.F. treat the remainder of this document? Since, in this instance, they have been given CIA clearance of a particular item or items, will they perforce regard the rest of the document as unclassified and release it at a later time without our knowledge? An example is the text footnoted to #46, Chapter II, page 95 (we have objected to the mention of a CIA unit [redacted] What does the remainder of this document say about the CIA planning group? What CIA names, either of officers or agents, might be therein revealed? There are, of course, numerous other classified documents which belong to other agencies (State, U.S. Army, JCS, etc.) which fall into the same category here, i.e., will they fail to receive full protection because they have been partially declassified by the unusual and troubling Air Force declassification procedures? This goes back to our original stipulation that to effect proper declassification decisions, the U.S.A.F. should have cleared each and every classified document with the agencies which are mentioned in these papers,

S E C R E T


S E C R E T

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no matter how painstaking that task might have been. We frankly consider it unconscionable for a military historian group to list hundreds of classified documents without providing classification information. The Division believes this sets a very bad precedent for the classification process and may, in fact, violate the classification order currently in being. At a minimum, DDA should insist to the U.S.A.F. that all documents containing CIA information remain classified except those portions which we have cleared via this memorandum.

7. A total of 32 hours was spent reviewing this manuscript.

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Attachments: As Stated H/W

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II.

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how that this thing can be worked out without his direct involvement. *State del. Turn*

He has an opportunity in about 10 days' time to consult with all these Laotian leaders in a convenient way because they are all gathering in Luang Prabang for the cremation of his father, rites which will go on for about a week in the royal capital.

SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT A NEUTRAL LAOS

The immediate situation is that the Soviets owe the British a reply on the suggestion that an immediate call for a cease-fire issue from the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom.

We are inclined to think that Mr. Khrushchev does mean what he says when he says that they would be willing to see an Austrian-type Laos come into existence. Now, that is a rather rash statement ordinarily, but I think in our conversations with Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko, we have gotten across to them that we are utterly serious about not being able or willing to accept a Communist Laos produced by this armed minority supplied from the north, and I think that there is no question but that they understand that we are serious about it

THE MILITARY SITUATION

Now, on the military track, I think we need to bear in mind that whatever the military action that might have to come in that country, the ultimate purpose would be to get a neutral Laos established, so that the military action which is contemplated is in support of a political settlement.

At the present time, the military situation is extremely messy and hard to define. There are not well-organized, well-trained, well-armed forces of Laotians on either side.

The Pathet Lao has been reinforced by Viet Minh guncrews, communications people, some company leaders, company commanders, truckdrivers, and a few specialists of that sort.

I think we have very good intelligence resources covering the area. Some extremely highly classified intelligence sources of ours exist, but also through these tribesmen, through photographic reconnaissance, and through normal combat-type intelligence, as well as agents operating throughout the area. We do not ourselves have evidence of any large Viet Minh units operating in Laos at the present time.

From time to time, the government spokesman talks about five or seven or nine Viet Minh battalions or regiments operating in there. We have not been able to find those units, and doubt very much that they are there.

One or two of these skirmishes that have occurred in the last 3 or 4 weeks, there is some evidence that the Viet Minh have provided some personnel for the immediate shock action, for the first firing, and then when the government forces give way, the Pathet Lao pass through and continue on from there.

SECRET

1/2 GAL. - PART "B"

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One of the great problems is that the government forces and, to some extent, the forces on the other side, are not fighting as we think of fighting. If one side has 60-mm mortars,

A few shots make a large battle. If one side has 60-mm mortars, and the other side 81-mm mortars, the 81-mm mortars tend to win because they make a larger noise.

It is not easy to get soldiers to lower their rifles at the horizontal and fire at someone rather than in the air.

General Phoumi declined to go to a particular place where he was needed not long ago. He pointed to the broken lifeline in his palm and said, "This means that I cannot make this trip."

We tried to get the King to stay in Vientiane, rather than run the risk of being captured at the royal capital, and he said, "I cannot do that because no ruling sovereign of Laos ever lived in Vientiane and died an actual death." When we pointed out to him that if he went to Luang Prabang he might be captured, he said, "But then, I have to be in Luang Prabang. I am cremating my father there next month, and they will not attack." It is just possible he is right in that situation out there.

The attack which was delivered on the crossroads of the road leading from Luang Prabang down to Vientiane about 3 or 4 weeks ago was probably in no more than company strength, and the government forces pulled away.

The recent vertical encirclement by helicopter of government paratroopers back in the Muongsoui area, on that road, was handled very well from a transport point of view. The soldiers all got in position where they were supported to be. But after they were dropped they did not move. The troops from the north did not move south; the troops from the south did not move north. Meanwhile, the other side dropped paratroopers on the tail of this outfit, so they occupied each other's rear, and there they sit.

27 We have tried to strengthen the government forces in a variety of ways. We have some Americans in there as civilians, but in an advisory capacity. We have managed to get some of them down as far as battalion level, although the government forces, the commanders, have been extremely reluctant to have any foreigners present with their front line troops. We think it is probably because they do not want to have the truth reported back in case of poor performance.

One of the most profitable things that has happened is that we have armed a considerable number of these tribesmen, who have been inflicting far more casualties on the other side than the government forces have by their hit-and-run tactics and raids along the roads, hitting convoys and ducks, and things of that sort. They are what Senator [Richard] Russell once referred to as the hard-nose boys. They are the most effective people in that area.

SECRET

1/2 GAL. - PART "B"

FORTRAN, D.

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IMPORTANCE OF DEFENDING LAOS

Meanwhile, we have been having serious talks with both the British and the French about how they saw the long term security problems of Southeast Asia, and what they thought the commitments under SEATO meant. I must say that we were considerably reassured when we put to them the more far-reaching and fundamental questions about whether they considered the security of Southeast Asia to be important.

Some of us could remember back in the Forties, and the gentlemen here will, that in the forties we and the British and French agreed not only that Southeast Asia, that the south of Southeast Asia was important, but that the position of the Red River delta up in the Hanoi area was the key to the security of Southeast Asia. Since then, that particular position has been lost, but the resulting situation in Southeast Asia, I think, tends to reinforce the judgment made at that time that the security problems would grow in difficulty if the opportunity for further penetration and expansion were extended into, from the Western point of view, a less favorable position.

Now, the defense of Laos is extremely difficult, is an extremely difficult one, from a military point of view, both because of its location and its terrain, the nature of the people, and the absence of, relative absence of, communications. But if Laos becomes Communist, then you transfer that problem to an even larger scale into Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.

At SEATO, at the Bangkok meeting, there was a genuine agreement on the part of the members that if the political—first, that we could not accept a Communist Laos—that if we could not obtain by negotiation a neutral Laos, that it would be necessary to use military effort to resist the taking over of the country by Communist forces.

A SOMEWHAT GLOOMING PICTURE

That is the situation in which we are today. We think that there probably will be a cease-fire and a conference, that the conference will concern itself with the international arrangements respecting the neutrality of Laos.

Going back as far as we can, to the Geneva Accords themselves, we think the matter of constructing a government inside of the country is something that the Laotians will have to take care of. We think our influence on that can be stronger on that basis than if an attempt were made in the conference to organize a government.

We ought not, I think—and I realize this is something of a gloomy picture here I am painting—but I think we ought not to blink at it. I do not think we ought to overestimate the materials than we are working with in this country.

Quite frankly, we do not know whether we can trust General Phoumi. There are reasons to make us doubt it. We do not know whether we can trust Prince Boun Oum, the present Prime Minister. ~~There are reasons to make us doubt it. We do not know whether we can trust Prince Boun Oum, the present Prime Minister.~~

SECRET

1/2 GAL.—PART "B"

R
FORTMAN, U.

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I think, myself—and this is, as I say, a little rash—I think, myself, if it were only Moscow involved on the other side, there would be a fair chance of doing this. I think Moscow has some problems with Peiping.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask you—

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. On this issue.

LIKELIHOOD OF CHINESE TROOPS BEING SENT

Senator SPARKMAN. We were told recently through the press that Communist China said when SEATO put forces in, she would send forces in. Do you believe that?

Secretary RUSK. The Foreign Minister said that, and I think that is something that does not add anything particularly new to the picture, because China is, of course, involved in this thing, has been all along. The Russian supply lines, the airlift, and things all are done through Chinese cooperation. I do not think we can assume any opposition or resistance on the part of China as to what is going on here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would they actually send Chinese troops or would they work through Viet Minh?

Secretary RUSK. I think you have to take account of the fact that, if you put organized SEATO forces in there, one of the real contingencies is that the Chinese may themselves put forces in. They have a common border with Laos, and I think we felt in our discussions with the Russians that the Russians are somewhat nervous about Peiping.

For example, the Russians raised with us the question of these Chinese Nationalist irregulars that have been up in northern Burma. The Burmese Army attacked them, and some of them went into northern Laos, and some dropped down into northern Thailand.

When we told the Russians we thought that problem was not connected with Laos, that it was an irrelevancy, and steps were being taken to remove it, the Russians were obviously relieved. I mean, this made some difference on their side.

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, what is the correct pronunciation of the party in Laos—

Secretary RUSK. The Pathet Lao.

Senator SPARKMAN. The Pathet Lao?

Secretary RUSK. P-a-t-h-e-t.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have heard it both ways, and I just wondered which was correct—Pathet Lao.

Secretary RUSK. Yes; I think that is correct.

Senator SPARKMAN. That would be the French pronunciation.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

State deletion

SECRET

1/2 GAL.—PART "B"

R
FORTMAN. U.

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AN AUSTRIAN TYPE OF NEUTRALITY

Senator SPARKMAN. Just one other question: You said that Moscow, you thought, would be willing to have an Austrian type of neutrality. Now, isn't an Austrian type of neutrality a possibility in Laos?

Secretary RUSK. You say is it not or is it?

Senator SPARKMAN. For instance, in Austria you do not have any Communists in the Austrian Government, do you?

Secretary RUSK. You do not, and we want to pin this adjective on Mr. Khrushchev just as much as we can for this reason: You see, we are not yet in the position of thinking or believing that you have to have Communists in this government in order to get a negotiated settlement here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, you could not have any of the Pathet Lao without having Communists, could you?

Secretary RUSK. Instinctively you would say, "Of course not." But I do not think we know enough about the commitments of these people really to know completely that every Pathet Lao is a confirmed Communist. I mean, just as I do not think we know enough about Phoumi and Boun Oum to say they are pro-Western, to be utterly realistic about it.

Now, there is a man, Vongvichit, who was the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, who was in the Cabinet 2 years ago, Minister of Religious Affairs. He is a bad egg, and you would not want him in there.

Prince Souphanouvang is certainly very far to the left, probably a Communist. He served for a time as Minister of Plans. As a matter of fact, he was a pretty good Minister of Plans so far as planning went, but his influence in the Cabinet was not good otherwise.

~~with the King, who, we think, is really committed to a neutral Lao, an Austrian kind of neutrality, if anything, friendly to our side, but we could rely pretty heavily on the King's estimate of these people. We are trying our best to win him deeply and heavily involved in this situation.~~

Senator SPARKMAN. ~~had a kind of disappointing experience with the King or Emperor of Vietnam, you remember. You think this fellow is a strong man? At home, he stays at home, does he not?~~

Secretary RUSK. I think it is rash to speak or surmise in talking about ~~of these people. Senator, I have never seen such~~

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Aiken.

SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION

Senator AIKEN. You indicated at one point, Mr. Secretary, that Peiping was not interested in conflict there.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I just indicated that we have not been able to find any—

Senator AIKEN. You have not been able to catch them at it.

¹ Bao Dai, who was removed as Chief of State in a 1955 referendum.

SECRET

1/2 GAL.—PART "B"

FORTMAN, U.

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Secretary RUSK. [continuing]. Any evidence of any significant movement of forces toward the south.

Senator AIKEN. But you do not find that Peiping is pushing for conflict, armed conflict in this area?

Secretary RUSK. I think Peiping is probably the force that is pushing hardest—

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. [continuing]. For a communized Laos. I think this is one of the reasons why there has been a certain time lag in Moscow responses on some of these things. I am sure they are consulting Peiping, and there has been some problem with it.

Senator AIKEN. Do you think Russia is monopolizing assistance to the Laotian rebels for the purpose of keeping Red China out?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know, sir, exactly how that works out. The Russians may be faced with a problem within the Communist bloc itself, to be at least as Bolshevik as the Chinese, in a contest for leadership of the Communist bloc.

I think it is also worth noting for what it might mean, and I am not sure that I know, that North Vietnam has been closer to Moscow than to Peiping. This may be because even in North Vietnam you get a share of that anti-Chinese feeling that you get throughout Southeast Asia.

Senator AIKEN. Distrust of the Chinese?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

PARTICIPANTS IN CONFLICT

Senator AIKEN. If conflict did come, would it be fought primarily between American and Chinese, Red Chinese—

Secretary RUSK. Well, we think—

Senator AIKEN [continuing]. Forces?

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. There are a number of steps which can be taken short of the involvement of major U.S. units, which could still make considerable difference; that is, ~~_____~~ get-

ting in some Americans as individuals rather than units, and getting in certain additional kinds of weapons and aircraft.

These things are in motion, so we feel that we can build up the pressures in support of negotiations without precipitating at this stage, yet, a major conflict between SEATO forces, including our own on the one side and, say, the Red Chinese forces on the other.

DIFFICULT BATTLEGROUND

Senator AIKEN. Would not Laos be a more difficult battleground for us than Korea was?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; if we are talking about large forces.

Senator AIKEN. I well recall General [Matthew] Ridgway's testimony before the committee at that time.

Secretary RUSK. There is no question that Laos would be. I do not believe, if you get to the point where you had to use major forces, that you would bring them around and put them into Laos through Thailand.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

SECRET

1/2 GAL.—PART "B"

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Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman?
 Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche.

BOTH SIDES MUST FACE CONSEQUENCES

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not want to leave this meeting with the state of mind that we are alone to be frightened about what will happen in Formosa and Korea and Germany because, undoubtedly, the others are also wondering what the impact will be.

Secretary RUSK. Exactly.

Senator LAUSCHE [continued]. What problems they may have in the satellite countries and other places that are involved.

Secretary RUSK. You are quite right, Senator. In our talks with the Russians we have gone to great lengths to make it clear to them that they must not underestimate us in this situation. I mean, it is rather easy for a dictatorship to underestimate a democracy until it is too late.

Senator GORE. I take it when you say that this would mean a vast, worldwide political involvement, that you were referring to Eastern Europe and to—

Secretary RUSK. You do not start serious shooting of this sort, where the great powers are nose to nose in confrontation, without having to face the fact that you are in confrontation with them in other places. If you make your decision without realizing that, you are irresponsible.

Now, I think the other side, as Senator Lausche points out, has to worry about exactly the same thing, you see.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. [The fact that they were so relieved when you got Formosa to pull those troops out of Burma indicates that they do not want friction.]

Secretary RUSK. I think they have some problems, and I really think that Moscow is much more ready to get to an Austrian Laos than is General Giap in North Vietnam or than is Peiping.

Senator GORE. May I ask a question?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

SOVIET ASCENDANCY V. CHINA'S PROXIMITY

Senator GORE. There are many puzzling factors involved here, but the most enigmatic, to me, is why the Soviet Union would be in the forefront here in an area that is so adjacent to Communist China. What is the answer to that?

Secretary RUSK. North Vietnam has always been much closer to Moscow than to Peiping. This may have something to do with it.

There is considerable trouble in South China. There are some very large areas there that were heavily hit by the food shortages, and we think the Chinese are pretty much involved with problems of their own in South China.

The Soviets, following the Communist Summit of last December, may feel they have got to play a hand here to demonstrate to the Communist bloc that they still are the leaders of the historic and inevitable world revolution. They may—and this is purely speculative—they may prefer to be in here themselves, to try to keep the situation under some control, than to turn it over to Peiping.

SECRET

1/2 GAL.—PART "B"

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Partial Transcript, Pages 339-343; 345-387, 1 May 1961

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>TEXT LINE</u>	<u>CIA REVIEW DECISION</u>
378	46 thru 49	Delete: "And they ... abroad." Reason: E.O. 12356, Section 1.3a(4)

CIA has reviewed again pages 339-343; 345-387 and has marked in brackets the passage indicated above that is classified. The remainder of the transcript is unclassified from the CIA point of view. The Department of State should be consulted on passages previously deleted from declassification at their request.

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remain secret; nothing that we do in this meeting will be a permanent secret.

No. 2, the people of our country—Ohio, at least—are sick and tired of being pushed around. I think that the people are ahead of our leaders in wanting the honor of our country to be maintained and to insure its security.

I agree with you, Mr. Secretary, that we cannot suffer Communist governments to become entrenched with their mighty iron power, and then hope that you are ever going to extricate them.

I think in Cuba the purpose will be to drive their stakes deeper, and to make themselves impregnable against any method of revolution.

That is all I have to say.

Senator MORSE. Senator Aiken.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION SOURCES

Senator AIKEN. Has the State Department been aware at all times, Mr. Secretary, of the organization and the progress made in training the expeditionary force?

Secretary RUSK. I think officers of the State Department have from the beginning.

Senator AIKEN. From the beginning?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; from more than a year ago.

Senator AIKEN. The State Department did not initiate the plan?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Who keeps you informed of what is going on?

Secretary RUSK. The machinery for this type of operation is interdepartmental and relatively restricted.

One of the things that must now be carefully reviewed is, first, under what circumstances this type of activity will be undertaken, and, second, what machinery for complete liaison there is among the departments.

At the present time, the interdepartmental groups working on this are somewhat limited in number, that is, all elements of the State Department are not drawn into this particular type of operation. The relevant bureau and the special officers who maintain liaison with Defense and CIA, of course, are very much involved with it.

Senator AIKEN. You rely upon your own information service largely?

Secretary RUSK. Our own information service.

Senator AIKEN. Of the State Department.

Secretary RUSK. There is a combined flow of information coming in from ourselves and from other agencies, and those get put together.

Senator AIKEN. But CIA works with you?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. But you think the State Department is kept adequately informed?

some opportunity for at least a large majority of OAS to take this question up, to consider what can now be done in the hemisphere.

This will not be unanimous because there are, perhaps, two governments that do not feel ready to take any overt part in such activities.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is Brazil even close to thinking—

Secretary RUSK. Brazil is in a rather different position. I think that we will find in Brazil that President Quadros will be moving very vigorously on his home front and he will be somewhat cautious on the foreign policy side, but I think on the issue of the penetration of the hemisphere from the outside, he will be much more cooperative than we would have supposed, say, a month ago that he might have been.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am glad for your optimism about that, which I do not share. But again I do not have all the facts at my command. From what I have seen and whatever intuition I have on the thing, I do not share your optimism on that.

ECUADOR; COLOMBIA; VENEZUELA

~~thought that the fellow down in Ecuador, Enriquez, was going to take any part in any sympathetic operation against Cuba that he thinks is on the side of the United States?~~

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to answer that one categorically this morning, but I would not rule it out as a possibility.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is well known that he has a hostile attitude, a hostility, towards the United States personally. He has been most consistently critical of the United States.

I do not know what we can expect from Colombia, with that strange internal political arrangement which they have there, which may or may not survive. I do not know whether it will or not.

I would guess, perhaps, that we could get some sympathetic attention out of Betancourt personally, but whether his internal political situation would permit him to operate or not—

~~think probably we have two countries in Central America that~~

But I just do not know where you are going to turn toward unanimity there on this thing.

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps I could come back, in connection with the development of further approach to Latin America, with a full report on this consultation which is now in progress. I cannot—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that you cannot answer them now because you are talking to these people.

Secretary RUSK. I cannot answer them now because we are in the process of talking.

PRESTIGE OF THE UNITED STATES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this: What do you think about the basic prestige and the standing of the United States if this thing just drifts in Cuba, and Castro keeps building up, and

* Camilo Ponce Enriquez, President of Ecuador.

* Romulo Betancourt, President of Venezuela.

State deletion